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Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant
Requirement
Property used in the commission of certain crimes is forfeited
by statute to the government.1 Forfeitures may be either criminal
or civil.2 A criminal forfeiture is part of the punishment of a con-
victed individual.3 Seizure for forfeiture follows conviction.4 In
contrast, civil forfeiture, with which this comment is concerned, is
aimed at the "guilty" property itself.5 Seizure precedes a civil, in
rem forfeiture trial.'
Most courts hold that a judicial warrant is not required for the
1 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592-1624 (1976) (forfeiture of smuggled goods and any vessel,
plane, or vehicle used to facilitate the smuggling); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976) (forfeiture of con-
trolled substances and the containers and conveyances thereof); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-789 (1976)
(forfeiture of vessels and vehicles used to transport or conceal any contraband, in particular
drugs, firearms, and counterfeit money); I.R.C. §§ 7302, 7321 (forfeiture of property used, or
intended for use, in violation of the Internal Revenue Code; this section most frequently is
applied to items associated with gambling, counterfeiting, or distilling).
The focus of this comment is on federal forfeitures. Because the fourth amendment
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, however, Wolf v. California, 338
U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), the argument extends to state forfeitures. The state statutes generally
are patterned after their federal counterparts.
2 The distinction may be more theoretical than real. See Note, Bane of American For-
feiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768 (1977).
3 Criminal forfeitures were abolished in this country in 1790, see S. REP. No. 91-617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969), but were reestablished in the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, which calls for the forfeiture of racketeering property owned by a defendant
convicted under the Act. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 437 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1976)). Section 408 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976), also provides for criminal forfeiture.
4 The Federal Rules require that the indictment allege the full extent of the property
subject to forfeiture, FE. R. CRiM. P. 7(c)(2), that the jury return a special verdict for
forfeiture, id. 31(e), and that the judgment authorize the seizure of the forfeit property, id.
32(b)(2). These rules do not apply to civil forfeitures. Id. 54(b)(5); id. 7(c)(2), 1979 Advisory
Comm. Notes.
The Supreme Court has described the nature of the proceeding thus:
A forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem. It is the property which is proceeded
against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were
conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the
wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted and punished. [Here t]he for-
feiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense.
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931) (citations
omitted).
' See text and notes at notes 17-28 infra.
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initial seizure of an article subject to civil forfeiture.7 This "forfeit-
ure exception" to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement
has not, however, been endorsed universally.8 After briefly describ-
ing forfeitures and the" forfeiture exception, this comment evalu-
ates the arguments for and against requiring a warrant for a for-
feiture seizure. It concludes that the justifications for dispensing
with the warrant are unsatisfactory and argues that property
seized for forfeiture without a warrant should be returned to the
owner.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Forfeiture
Forfeiture has been criticized as odious, harsh, and inflexible.'
Nevertheless, it has withstood both the test of time and repeated
I United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac
Lemans, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264
(10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1966); Sanders v.
United States, 201 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1953). The Supreme Court expressly refused to con-
sider the issue in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 n.14
(1974), and other decisions of the Court cannot be read as authorizing the exception, see
Note, The Forfeiture Exception to the Warrant Requirement: A Distinction Without a
Difference, 67 VA. L. REv. 1035, 1038-41 (1981).
8 A few courts have held that a warrant must be obtained. United States v. McCormick,
502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974); Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Mass.) (three judge
court), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973); United
States v. One 1949 Model Ford Coach Automobile, 101 F. Supp. 492 (W.D.S.C. 1951); De-
partment of Natural Resources v. Seaman, 396 Mich. 299, 240 N.W.2d 206 (1976); Fuqua v.
Armour, 543 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. 1976). See also United States v. Walters, 647 F.2d 947, 951
(6th Cir. 1981) (action for forfeiture of firearms remanded for decision whether the seizure
exceeded the scope of the warrant obtained); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans,
621 F.2d 444, 451-59 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Pruett, 551
F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1977), rehearing denied, 569 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1978) (warrant-
less seizure in forfeiture situation held unconstitutional, although the forfeiture exception
apparently was raised explicitly only on petition for rehearing); Interbartolo v. United
States, 303 F.2d 34, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1962) (but for imposing precedent, court would require a
warrant for forfeiture seizures in the absence of exigent circumstances); United States v.
Thrower, 442 F. Supp. 272, 278 (E.D. Pa.) (warrantless search and seizure upheld under the
automobile exception, but validity of such seizures under forfeiture statutes questioned),
aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Forfeiture of 1972 Porsche, 307 So. 2d 451,
452-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (warrantless search and seizure for forfeiture illegal); 2 W.
LAFAv, SARCH AND SEIZURE 550-52 (1978); Note, supra note 7.
' United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-21 (1971); State v.
1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479, 484-85 (La. 1977). See also cases cited at note 115
infra; Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 252 (1973).
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constitutional challenges.10 The notion of the guilty chattel has
been traced to the Book of Exodus,1 which dictates that a goring
ox is to be killed and left uneaten.12 In early modern England,
forfeiture took the form of the deodand, by which the instrument
of a person's death was forfeited to the Crown.' 3 In this country,
early civil forfeitures occurred primarily in admiralty,14 and for-
feiture provisions long have been included in the revenue laws.' 5
"[C]ontemporary federal and state forfeiture statutes reach virtu-
ally any type of property that might be used in the conduct of a
criminal enterprise."'
The modern statutory schemes call for the seizure of certain
property which, because used illegally, is contraband forfeit to the
government.' Seizure brings the item within the jurisdiction of the
10 "'[Wlhether the reason for [the forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed
in the remedial and punitive jurisprudence of this country to be now displaced.'" Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (qdoting J.W. Goldsmith-
Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1921)) (forfeiture not a denial of proce-
dural due process despite absence of preseizur6 notice and opportunity for a hearing). See
also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (forfeit-
ure not a violation of the double jeopardy clause); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926)
(forfeiture of innocent owner's property not an unconstitutional taking).
"' See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 291 (Oxford 1765);
Note, Rendering Illegal Behavior Unprofitable: Vehicle Forfeiture Under the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act, 8 CREIGHTON L. REv. 471, 472 (1974).
12 "When an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox shall be stoned, and its flesh
may not be eaten; the owner of the ox shall be free from liability." Exodus 21:28 (New
English). The view that the Biblical rule is linked to modern forfeiture is challenged in
Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 180-82.
13 See O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 24-28 (1881) (tracing the development of for-
feitures from the deodand); Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 250-51. See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 11, at 290-92. Although comfortable with forfeitures in their punitive form,
Blackstone seemed troubled when the link between the owner of the forfeit property and
the crime is attenuated, as when A runs B through with C's sword. Id. at 291. The deodand,
which was never fully established in this country, was abolished in England in 1846. Note,
supra note 11, at 473.
14 E.g., The Emily, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 381 (1824) (forfeiture of vessel used in illegal
slave trade); The Hoppet, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 389 (1813) (forfeiture of vessel used to import
goods illegally); La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) (forfeiture of vessel used to export
arms and ammunition illegally).
1 E.g., Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 23, 14 Stat. 151; Act of February 18, 1793, ch. 8,
§§ 8, 9, 12, 1 Stat. 305 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 7302, 7321).
10 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
7 A distinction must be drawn between per se contraband and derivative contraband.
Derivative contraband-for example, a car or money used criminally-is contraband only by
virtue of its illegal use. There is nothing criminal in its possession as such. Per se contra-
band-for example, a narcotic substance-is contraband by definition; no property rights
can exist therein, and its very possession is criminal. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. United
States, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965); United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir.
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court and prevents its destruction, sale, or concealment.' 8 After the
seizure, the government is required to notify the owner, who must
post bond if he wishes to claim the property.19 Although some
courts have found the owner entitled to an immediate postseizure
administrative hearing,20 this is not a statutory requirement. 2
If a claimant appears, the government files an in rem civil suit
for forfeiture of the property; the property itself is the named de-
fendant.2 2 Because the property is technically forfeit on commis-
sion of the crime, the trial is characterized as an action to perfect
the government's title.28 The statutes are largely silent as to the
specific procedures to be followed at the trial.2' The government
bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of probable
cause for the seizure and forfeiture; the burden then shifts to the
property's owner to establish that the property is not in fact for-
feit.25 The inquiry focuses on whether the alleged crime occurred
and, if so, the extent of the property's involvement in its commis-
sion. Neither the acquittal of the criminal defendant2" nor the ig-
norance or innocence of the owner2 7 are valid defenses. 2 8 Although
1979). Forfeiture statutes do not forfeit per se contraband; they affect only property that
otherwise would belong to its nominal owner-that is, derivative contraband. No warrant is
necessary for the seizure of per se contraband because its possessor, by definition, has no
protected interest therein. There is a strong public policy against leaving such contraband in
private possession. Those cases requiring a warrant for forfeiture seizures are careful not to
extend that requirement to per se contraband. See Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205,
1210 (D. Mass.), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 486 F.2d 1032 (1st Cir. 1973). See
also United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 454 n.8 (lst Cir. 1980) (Cof-
fin, C.J., dissenting).
:8 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
" E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1608 (1976) (incorporated by reference in 21 U.S.C. § 881(d)
(1976)).
'0 See Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978); Lee v. Thornton, 538
F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976).
21 See generally Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes:
The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw. L.J. 925 (1980).
22 If no claimant appears, the property is forfeited summarily. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1609
(1976). See text and note at note 143 infra.
23 See United States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647, 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837
(1971).
"' But see 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1976). The Supplemental Rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure govern so far as applicable. United States v. $5,372.85 in United States Coin
& Currency, 283 F. Supp. 904, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Jury trial is available. 1 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACriCE 1 0.62[15] (2d ed. 1980).
20 See United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette, 496 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
6 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-35
(1972) (per curiam).
27 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-86 (1974). The rigid-
ity of this rule may be easing somewhat. See Note, supra note 7, at 1049.
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most statutes allow for administrative clemency in particularly
harsh cases,2 9 the courts are required to follow the letter of the
statute."
B. The Forfeiture Exception
Although warrantless searches and seizures usually violate the
fourth amendment,31 the warrant requirement is not all-encom-
passing. No warrant is required for arrests,32 for seizures incident
to arrest,33 when the subject consents to the search, 4 for searches
and seizures at international borders,35 and, under certain limited
exceptions, for automobile searches. 6 Moreover, warrants are not
required for the seizure of abandoned property 7 or of evidence in
28 See generally United States v. Four Pinball Machines, 429 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-07
(D. Hawaii 1977).
29 E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1976).
30 E.g., United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 337 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Andrade, 181 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. One 1977 Chevrolet
Pickup, 503 F. Supp. 1027, 1029, 1030 (D. Colo. 1980).
"1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1976).
33 Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
3' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
35 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977).
38 Under the so-called "automobile exception," a somewhat unclear and much debated
concept first articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151, 155-56 (1925), a
warrantless search and seizure of an automobile is valid when the enforcement agent has
probable cause and there are exigent circumstances. See Moylan, The Automobile Excep-
tion: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale In Search of A Clearer Label, 27 MaR-
CER L. REv. 987 (1976); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 835 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]; Note, Warrantless Searches and
Seijures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistently
Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv. 722 (1975). "Exigent circumstances" typically
arise because the car is being driven away. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 135-
36 (1925); United States v. 1964 Ford Thunderbird, 445 F.2d 1064, 1067 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972).
Although the majority of forfeiture cases involve the seizure of automobiles, the forfeit-
ure exception is distinct from the automobile exception. The latter doctrine posits a set of
circumstances that makes a warrantless search and seizure reasonable and therefore not
violative of the fourth amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 382 n.9 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring). In contrast, the forfeiture exception holds a warrantless seizure
reasonable, even though no exigency exists, because the property is subject to different
treatment by virtue of being forfeit.
37 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
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"plain view""8 or in the "open fields."3 9 "Exigent circumstances"
also may excuse the warrant requirement. 0
In addition, most courts recognize a "forfeiture exception"
under which an agent may seize property without a warrant when-
ever he has probable cause to believe the property is forfeit to the
government. "1 Most forfeiture statutes make no reference to war-
rants. Although a number of courts have inferred congressional en-
dorsement of warrantless seizure from this silence, 2 the statutes
are ambiguous, typically providing merely that property "shall be
seized. '4 3
19 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
39 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
40 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14-15 (1948).
41 See note 7 supra.
42 United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 456 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1103 (1977); Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 1965). See also United
States v. Whitlock, 418 F. Supp. 138, 141 (E.D. Mich. 1976), afl'd mem., 566 F.2d 583 (7th
Cir. 1977).
,' E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(a) (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976). Some statutes explicitly
provide for the use of warrants. See 21 U.S.C. § 334(b) (1976); 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1976).
Two important forfeiture statutes, although vague, arguably require a warrant for
seizure. The Internal Revenue Code directs that property used or intended for use in viola-
tion of the Code is forfeit and that a warrant for its seizure "may issue." I.R.C. § 7302. At
the least, this language suggests that seizure pursuant to a warrant is the favored procedure,
and the statute might be read to require a warrant when there are no exigent circumstances.
The courts generally have not adopted this interpretation. See United States v. One 1975
Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[W]e find nothing in either this specific
language or the statutory scheme as a whole that reflects any congressional intent to require
a warrant for the execution of section 7302 seizures."). But see United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48, 52-54 (1951) (holding that the predecessor of section 7302 required a warrant and
that the warrantless search of a hotel room and seizure of untaxed drugs were illegal);
United States v. One Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1950), overruled on other
grounds, United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211, 212-13 (3d Cir.
1963).
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 requires forfeiture
of controlled substances and their containers and conveyances. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976). The
statute provides for seizure "upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims" except when the seizure is incident to arrest, the
property already has been judged to be forfeit, the property is dangerous, or the Attorney
General has probable cause to believe the property has been or will be used in violation of
the Act. Id. § 881(b). A literal reading of the final exception would seem to endorse the
forfeiture exception, and it has been so read. United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717, 720
(8th Cir. 1979). However, if no warrant were required when the agent had probable cause,
the provision for a warrant would have no meaning; thus read, the statute would never
require a warrant. The exception therefore must be read more narrowly. Common sense, the
nature of the first three exceptions, and comparison with the standard exceptions to the
warrant requirement suggest that the fourth exception should be limited to situations in
19811
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The forfeiture exception is illustrated in United States v. One
1975 Pontiac Lemans.44 Charles Zullo, a numbers runner using his
wife's Pontiac to transport betting slips, had not paid the special
wagering tax;45 the car therefore was property used and intended
for use in violating the revenue laws and subject to forfeiture.46
Without a warrant, revenue agents seized Mrs. Zullo's car from a
public street. No criminal proceedings against Zullo were initiated,
nor did the Treasury Department attempt to recover the unpaid
taxes.47 The district court upheld the warrantless seizure and de-
clared the car forfeit;' 8 the First Circuit affirmed 9 over the strong
dissent of Chief Judge Coffin.
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. McCor-
mick 50 that a warrant is required for forfeiture seizures because no
exception explicitly authorized by the Supreme Court applies.5 1
The court argued that Congress cannot legislate additional excep-
tions to the warrant requirement.5 2 To construe the statute in ac-
which there are exigent circumstances, which are likely to be associated with the sudden
appearance of probable cause. This view was taken in United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324
(1st Cir. 1979). The court construed the fourth exception to section 881(b) to mean that
warrantless seizures may occur only immediately after probable cause arises, when exigen-
cies preclude the procurement of a warrant. Nonetheless, it held that contraband discovered
during a subsequent inventory search of an illegally seized automobile need not be excluded
from the defendant's criminal trial. Id. at 330-31. See also O'Reilly v. United States, 486
F.2d 208, 213-15 (8th Cir.) (Lay, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043 (1979). Contra,
United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 367-68 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1977 Lin-
coln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1981).
Whether these statutes should be read to require a warrant for seizure absent exigent
circumstances is complicated by disagreement about whether forfeiture statutes should be
liberally or strictly construed. Compare United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12 (1890) and
Note, supra note 11, at 478 (advocating a liberal construction) with United States v. One
Assortment of 25 Firearms, 483 F. Supp. 16, 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("forfeitures are not fa-
vored and should not be enforced unless they are within the letter and spirit of the law");
Kane v. McDaniel, 407 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Ky. 1975); and 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STAT-
UTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.11, at 214 (rev. 4th ed. 1974) ("those provisions in revenue acts
which impose ... forfeitures ... are given the same strict construction ordinarily applied
to p'enal laws").
, 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
This tax is required by I.R.C. § 4411.
I.R.C. § 7302.
Joint Appendix, Stipulated Facts at 6, United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans,
621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
,s 470 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (D. Mass. 1979).
" 621 F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980).
50 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
51 Id. at 285-89.
52 Id. at 285-86. McCormick relied largely on Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973), which held that Congress cannot legislate in violation of the requirements
of the fourth amendment. Id. at 272. McCormick read this holding as dictating that
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cordance with the presumption of constitutionality, the court im-
plied a provision requiring a warrant except when a traditional
basis for a warrantless seizure exists.5"
The McCormick rationale goes too far. The exceptions to the
warrant requirement authorized by the Supreme Court are not
comprehensive; they only are descriptive of specific circumstances
in which a warrantless search or seizure is reasonable and therefore
constitutional. Congress surely may identify similar circum-
stances, 54 and its judgment deserves a certain deference.5 5 Thus, it
is proper neither to allow the forfeiture exception because Con-
gress has called for it, nor to disallow it because it is not identical
to exceptions already articulated by the Supreme Court. An inde-
pendent assessment of its constitutionality is required.
II. RATIONALES FOR THE FORFEITURE EXCEPTION
The rationales for the forfeiture exception include the osten-
sible shift of property rights in the seized item and the in rem
nature of the forfeiture action.56 This section explores these
rationales and concludes that neither supports dispensing with
warrants for forfeiture seizures.
A. Shifting Property Rights
Many courts have justified the forfeiture exception by reason-
ing that the government needs no warrant to take what it already
owns. 57 These courts argue that because property rights in an
"[u]nless the statute itself falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, it
must yield to the right to be secure against searches and seizures." 502 F.2d at 285.
53 502 F.2d at 288-89. The Ninth Circuit arguably has retreated from its original posi-
tion but has distinguished rather than overruled McCormick. See United States v. Kimak,
624 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1980), which upheld a warrantless forfeiture seizure when made
on the spot of the crime and within the Carroll automobile exception, see note 36 supra.
" See United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.)
("We realize that upholding the validity of the statute as so construed [to allow warrantless
forfeiture seizures] amounts to recognizing that Congress. . . may in effect create a further
exception to the requirement of a search warrant .... Congress [has not] here exceeded its
constitutional powers in dispensing with a search warrant.").
" United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1940).
" The underlying practical justification for the forfeiture exception is presumably its
convenience; this assumes rather than argues for the constitutionality of warrantless
seizures. Inconvenience never can be allowed to affect the evaluation of whether a warrant is
required. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1948); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705-06 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
1, See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980);
United States v. Pappas, 600 F.2d 300, 306 (1st Cir.) ("[A] property interest of this sort,
1981]
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offending article pass to the government on commission of the
crime,"" the article therefore is contraband and, as such, is "not
property the ownership or possession of which the law protects." 59
The Supreme Court invited this property rights rationale in Boyd
v. United States0 by distinguishing the seizure of private papers,
for which it required a warrant, from seizure of forfeit or stolen
goods."1
1. Privacy Expectations. Although the government's prop-
erty rights sanction the forfeiture seizure, they have no bearing on
how the seizure should be carried out. Focusing on property rights
affected ignores critical privacy interests.6 2 Privacy concerns are
implicated whenever a search must be conducted to discover the
article to be seized. The status of the property seized has no bear-
ing on the vitality of these privacy interests with respect to a
search. 3 Thus, even if the government's purported property rights
created by operation of law, places the agents of the government in a different position
constitutionally vis-a-vis the forfeit vehicle than would otherwise be true."), vacated for
rehearing en banc and decided on other grounds, 613 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. Zaicek, 519 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416,
418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Sanders v. United States, 201 F.2d 158, 159
(5th Cir. 1953) ("The Fourth Amendment does not guarantee against seizures ... [where]
the right to the property has already passed to the United States by forfeiture.").
This rationale suggests that there is no seizure in the fourth amendment sense and
therefore no need to evaluate reasonableness. Pushed to extremes, this fiction becomes ab-
surd. E.g., United States v. One 1952 Victoria, 114 F. Supp. 458, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1953)
("[S]eizure occurs when the car is illegally used. The physical repossession of the automobile
may occur subsequently.").
11 United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890); Simons v. United States, 541 F.2d
1351, 1352 (9th Cir. 1976); Weathersbee v. United States, 263 F.2d 324, 326 (4th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Pacific Finance Corp., 110 F.2d 732, 733 (2d Cir. 1940).
" United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958
(1966).
80 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
81 Id. at 623 ("In the one case, the government is entitled to possession of the property,
in the other it is not."). Although this language has carried great weight with courts permit-
ting warrantless forfeiture seizures, see United States v. Francolino, 367 F.2d 1013, 1022 (2d
Cir. 1966); Grogan v. United States, 261 F.2d 86, 87 (5th Cir. 1958), the Boyd reference to
forfeit property is mere dictum. "What Mr. Justice Bradley said [in Boyd] about stolen or
forfeited goods or contraband is, of course, not accurate if read to mean that they may be
seized at any time even without a warrant or not incident to an arrest that is lawful." War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 318 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
'2 Modern fourth amendment jurisprudence emphasizes privacy rather than property
interests. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 143 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 304-05 (1967).
83 "It is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain articles subject to
seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself justify a search without a warrant." Jones v. United
States, 337 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1958).
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justify a warrantless seizure, they cannot support a warrantless
search.6 4 Although no court explicitly has asserted to the contrary,
reliance on the forfeiture exception has led to some careless deci-
sions from which this result might be inferred.6 5 The forfeiture ex-
ception must not be used to justify otherwise unconstitutional war-
rantless searches.66
The usual forfeiture situation, seizure of an automobile from a
public area or driveway, does not involve so obvious an intrusion
on privacy. However, there is an expectation of privacy in an auto-
mobile, 7 an expectation unavoidably intruded upon by the process
of seizure. Moreover, the car almost certainly will be subject to a
subsequent warrantless search. Thus, privacy interests are impli-
cated even when no search for the article to be seized is necessary.
Finally, even where individual interests do not fit squarely
within the current jurisprudential "privacy" mold, seizure remains
an intrusion. In an effort to protect property interests, some
courts 9 and commentators70 have expanded notions of "privacy"
" The law of arrest parallels the law of seizure in this respect. See Steagald v. United
States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648 (1981) (arrest warrant does not authorize search of third
party's home for subject of warrant; arrest warrant goes to reasonableness of the seizure, but
not of the search).
65 E.g., Sanders v. United States, 201 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1953) (car seized on private
premises); United States v. One Bally "Barrell-O-Fun," 224 F. Supp. 794 (M.D. Pa. 1963)
(seizure of pinball machines from inside amusement hall), aff'd mem. sub nom. Brozettie v.
Rogers, 337 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1964).
66 See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), in which agents searched a hotel
room and seized untaxed drugs that were forfeit under the predecessor to I.R.C. § 7302. The
government argued that because under the statute no property rights existed in the prop-
erty, the search and seizure without a warrant was valid. The Court rejected this contention,
noting that "Congress, in abrogating property rights in such goods, merely intended to aid
in their forfeiture" and not to affect the fourth amendment's requirements. Id. at 53-54.
'7 Although the interior of an automobile is not granted the same status as the interior
of a home, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 52 (1970), significant privacy interests in automobiles do exist, United States v.
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62
(1971) ("The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment
fades away and disappears."). Even though the expectation of privacy in the interior of a car
is minimal, that in the glove compartment or trunk is substantial. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978).
48 See text and notes at notes 120-129 infra.
" In State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940, 945-46 (Me. 1981), the court found unconstitutional
the seizure of gems pursuant to a warrant inadequately describing the items to be seized,
even though the gems were on display at a jeweler's. Although the invitation of public scru-
tiny indicated the absence of any expectation of privacy in the usual sense, the majority
labeled the seizure an invasion of privacy. See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S.
319, 329 (1979) (legitimate expectation of privacy despite display of items to the general
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beyond their logical boundaries. Such a semantic sleight-of-hand
correctly recognizes the inherent intrusiveness of seizure; it would
be more honest, however, to acknowledge the fourth amendment's
protection of proprietary interests.7 1
It might be argued, however, that when property rights shift
to the government because of the illegal use of an article, there is a
concomitant abandonment of privacy expectations. If an owner
wrote out a deed transferring property to the United States, the
government presumably would not be required to obtain a warrant
to take the property, because the owner would have abandoned all
his rights of property and privacy. In a sense, illegal use of the
property is the equivalent of such a transfer. Although the owner
might still object to the actual seizure, the transfer is nonetheless
voluntary in that the crime was volitional and knowledge of the
forfeiture statute must be presumed. The fourth amendment pro-
tects only "legitimate" expectations of privacy; 2 having forfeited
the property by his own criminal actions, the owner retains no
such interest.
Even if the forfeiture is seen as effecting such a voluntary
transfer, however,"3 the deed situation is distinguishable for three
reasons. First, in the forfeiture case the claimant may have been
unaware of the illegal activity. It is difficult to believe that parents
no longer have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the family car
because their son drove it with marijuana in his pocket. Second,
most property that theoretically is subject to forfeiture is never
proceeded against. The owner of such property retains, or at least
eventually regains, a legitimate privacy interest in the property. Fi-
nally, even if the technical transfer of ownership is sufficient to
destroy privacy expectations, a warrant serves the important func-
tion of ensuring that such a transfer in fact has occurred.
2. The Ex Post Nature of the Property Rights Rationale.
public).
70 See Note, supra note 7, at 1046 ("a privacy interest may also be defined as encom-
passing the individual's interest in controlling material goods owned by him") (footnote
omitted).
7, The fourth amendment requires a warrant to describe not only "the place to be
searched, [but also] the persons or things to be seized." See note 31 supra. See also United
States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 455 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J., dissent-
ing); State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940, 951-52 (Me. 1981) (Carter, J., concurring) (although
there was no expectation of privacy, seizure violated a proprietary interest).
72 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
73 For the view that forfeiture works an involuntary transfer and that privacy expecta-
tions remain, see Harvard Note, supra note 36, at 847-48.
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The property rights rationale, grounded on factual assumptions
not proven at the time of the seizure, is illogical. 4 It is a basic
tenet of fourth amendment jurisprudence that searches and
seizures cannot be justified ex post.75 It would be more logical to
argue that the probability that the property is forfeit gives the
government a sufficient interest to seize it without a warrant. Yet a
warrant is required in part because probable interests fall short of
absolute rights. To consider the property already forfeit for the
purpose of seizure is to overlook the very essence of the warrant
requirement-to have an impartial judicial officer assess the situa-
tion before allowing the enforcement agent to proceed.7,
3. The G.M. Leasing Case. The foregoing privacy/property
distinctions are necessary to understand the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,/ which has been
cited in support of the forfeiture exception. 8 In G.M. Leasing, the
Internal Revenue Service seized several cars from the plaintiff cor-
poration, which was the alter ego of a delinquent taxpayer against
whom the IRS had made a jeopardy assessment. The seizures were
made from public places without a warrant. Addressing the auto-
mobile seizures in a single perfunctory paragraph, the Court found
no constitutional violation.7 9 The G.M. Leasing seizures closely re-
semble the typical forfeiture situation, and at first blush the case
seems to indicate that a warrant is not required for forfeiture
74 Courts have rejected similar attempts by the government to impose substantive con-
sequences stemming from the theoretical shift in property rights prior to an actual judicial
determination. See Rogers v. United States, 47 AM. FED. TAx REP. 2D (P-H) 81-690 (D.
Minn. 1980); United States v. $22,993.00 in Currency, 332 F. Supp. 1277 (E.D. La. 1971)
(both rejecting the argument that because title passed on commission of the crime, the for-
mer owner had at best a claim to seized currency and therefore, under the Assignment of
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), could not assign his interest in the property).
75 For example, in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the state attempted to justify
a warrantless search of a building on a theory of abandonment by arson. There was no
dispute that abandoned premises can be searched and that arson constitutes abandonment.
The search was not permitted, however, because "it is ... impossible to justify a warrant-
less -search on the ground of abandonment by arson when that arson has not yet been
proved." Id. at 505-06. See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959); United
States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
7' See text and notes at notes 108-119 infra.
7 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
78 See United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One
1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Pappas, 600 F.2d
300, 304 (1st Cir.), vacated for rehearing en banc and decided on other grounds, 613 F.2d
324 (1st Cir. 1979).
79 429 U.S. at 351-52. The Court went on to find the warrantless seizure of the corpora-
tion's papers from its offices unconstitutional. Id. at 352-59.
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seizures-at least of automobiles on public streets.
Important distinctions, however, cut against such a reading.80
There was no question in G.M. Leasing that the taxpayer owed
taxes and that the IRS could seize his property to satisfy that
debt."' Moreover, the privacy interests of the individual taxpayer
and the corporation were minimal at best. The expectation of pri-
vacy in a corporation's car used for customer rental is less than
that in a personal car, the seizures were not followed by a police
search, and the seizures did not occur on property belonging either
to the corporation or the taxpayer.82 In addition, because the tax-
payer had notice of the impending seizure,8" he had time to protect
his privacy interest. Finally, it can be argued that in a tax levy case
there are no privacy interests anywhere in the car because all
items, including those in the trunk or glove compartment, are also
part of the levy and belong to the IRS. In the typical forfeiture
situation, in contrast, the government has rights only to the auto-
mobile, not to items therein.
G.M. Leasing should be read only as authorizing a warrantless
seizure where there is a complete absence of both property and
privacy interests. In relying on G.M. Leasing to justify the forfeit-
ure exception, however, the First Circuit viewed the decision as
combining reduced property and privacy interests to justify war-
rantless seizures.84 To so read G.M. Leasing is to attempt to add
80 Strong arguments also can be made that G.M. Leasing was wrongly decided. See 2
W. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 552-53; Rosenthal, Jeopardy and Termination Assessments
After Laing and Hall: Jeopardizing the Fourth Amendment, 31 TAx L. REv. 317, 351-54
(1976) (arguing, before G.M. Leasing, that a warrant should be required for jeopardy assess-
ment seizures).
"' Tax assessments are "given the force of a judgment." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S.
247, 260 (1935). The government's property right was equally indisputable in the cases re-
lied on by the Court in G.M. Leasing. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), seizure to satisfy a debt to the United States was made
pursuant to a "warrant of distress," an administrative warrant issued by the Solicitor of the
Treasury. As the Court felt obliged to point out, a warrant of distress is "conclusive evi-
dence of the facts recited in it, and of the authority to make the levy." Id. at 285. In Hester
v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), federal agents seized distilled liquor in an open field.
No property rights existed in the liquor because it was per se contraband, and in any case it
had been abandoned. Id. at 58-59. In contrast to the forfeiture situation, these cases did not
require a magistrate's judgment to determine the probability that the property belonged to
the government.
82 429 U.S. at 344.
83 IRS agents had visited the taxpayer's home seeking payment and had filed notice of
tax liens with the county recorder's office. Id. at 342-43.
84 United States v. Pappas, 600 F.2d 300, 304 (1st Cir.) ("While the [G.M. Leasing]
Court's analysis was conclusory, it was evidently based upon the owner's reduced expecta-
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apples and oranges. Property and privacy interests are indepen-
dent factors, each deserving of the protection of a warrant, and the
partial absence of both should not be combined synergistically to
eliminate the necessity of a warrant for forfeiture seizures.
B. The In Rem Nature of the Civil Forfeiture Action
Civil forfeiture always has been viewed as a remedial proceed-
ing directed solely against an offending object.8 5 It is independent
of any action against a criminal defendant se and may go forward
tion of privacy and the government's claim of a property right. . . ."), vacated for rehear-
ing en banc and decided on other grounds, 613 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1979). The Pappas court
applied this combinative approach to forfeiture seizures: "where the car owner's expectation
of privacy is least ... and the government's interest most basic-i.e., a statutory property
right-a warrantless seizure could generally be sustained." 600 F.2d at 305.
s. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1884); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14
(1827). A number of nonpunitive justifications have been suggested: forfeiture repays society
for the damage done by the crime and the cost of investigation, United States v. 86.9 Cases,
More or Less of Assorted Distilled Spirits, Wine and Beer, 337 F. Supp. 1355, 1356 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); it removes the tools of the criminal trade, United States v. Jenison, 484 F. Supp.
747, 753 (D.R.I. 1980); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383, 1391
(W.D. Pa. 1979); and it discourages criminal behavior by decreasing its profitability, H.R.
REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2952.
There remains a built-in tension in the very concept of a civil, remedial forfeiture.
When the owner is innocent, the justifications for forfeiture seem insufficient; the natural
inclination is to search for an underlying punitive link and object if one cannot be found.
Arguably, the many disputes surrounding civil forfeitures stem from this inherent tension.
See note 43 supra, concerning the debate over the strictness with which forfeiture statutes
should be construed. Courts and commentators have struggled with the criminal overtones
of forfeiture, See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-89 (1974)
(emphasizing that forfeitures are civil and that the owner's innocence is no defense); United
States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-22 (1971) (emphasizing the pu-
nitive elements of forfeiture and suggesting that the innocence of the owner might block
forfeiture); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (labeling forfeitures "quasi-crim-
inal"); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976) (forfeitures
are criminal for fourth and fifth amendment purposes, but "not criminal enough" to prevent
placing the burden of proof on the claimant). The continued vitality of this confusion is
demonstrated by a recent Sixth Circuit case regarding gamblers' fifth amendment rights in
defending an action for forfeiture of gambling profits. United States v. United States Cur-
rency, 626 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1980). In his concurring opinion, Judge Merritt took the major-
ity to task for treating forfeiture "as a kind of hybrid which is neither fish nor fowl" and
argued that forfeiture should be characterized as a purely criminal proceeding. Id. at 18. See
generally Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Pen-
alty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478 (1974); Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeit-
ures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 475-81 (1976); Note,
supra note 2, at 783-85, 800-02.
s' Neither the conviction nor the acquittal of the criminal defendant, who may or may
not be the owner of the property, has any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the
forfeiture. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234-35
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even if criminal charges are never brought. 87 Thus, it is arguable
that forfeiture falls entirely within the civil ambit, where constitu-
tional protections are traditionally less stringent than in criminal
proceedings"8 and where the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment is not always strictly applied. 9 It is fallacious, however, to
equate a forfeiture seizure with a simple civil attachment. The
action is a form of punishment, 0 frequently used as a substitute
for criminal prosecution.91 The Supreme Court has made it clear
that these criminal overtones necessitate observance of the fourth
amendment.9 2  Although that amendment requires only that
seizures be reasonable, a warrant, which usually is necessary to en-
sure reasonableness, cannot be avoided simply because the action
is "civil." ' s As one court has written, the Supreme Court's forfei-
(1972).
11 This was the case, for example, in United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621
F.2d 444 (1st Cir. 1980); see Joint Appendix, Stipulated Facts at 6.
" See Charney, supra note 85, at 480.
89 See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). Even in the civil context some process is required,
however. "[T]he Fourth Amendment does.., apply to such seizures, in both its substan-
tive prohibition against unreasonable seizures and its procedural requirement of judicial or
quasi-judicial review of the decision to seize." Id. See also Supp. RULES TO FED. R. Civ. P.
FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY & MARITIME CLAIMS B(1), C(2), C(3) (issuance of a warrant for
seizure on the basis of verified complaint, sworn affidavit, and description of item to be
seized). Cf. United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 328-29 (1st Cir. 1979) (probable cause
requirement applies to warrants issued under Supplemental Rule C); United States v. Arti-
cles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39, 43 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding fourth amendment's
probable cause requirement satisfied by the Supplemental Rules procedure).
90 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1971)
("When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their entirety, it is manifest that they are in-
tended to impose a penalty only upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal
enterprise."); United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa.
1979) (finding a trend supporting a constitutional prohibition against forfeiture of property
of innocent owner who acted reasonably under the circumstances).
"' See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 701 (1965). Forfeiture
frequently serves the same ends as criminal prosecution more effectively and efficiently. If
forfeiture rules are drawn too loosely, "the Government, by electing to proceed against sus-
pects via the forfeiture route, could deprive citizens of the constitutionally-mandated safe-
guards which surround the criminal process." United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F.
Supp. 1200, 1206 (D.N.H. 1974).
92 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02 (1965) (extending
the exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634
(1886) ("As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of of-
fences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature, we think that they are within the
reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Consti-
tution . . ").
3 Moore concedes that "there may be constitutional limitations on the power to use
maritime seizure procedures [for in rem actions] to enforce government forfeiture or penal
[48:960
Forfeiture Seizures
ture opinions indicate "that the civil nature of forfeiture proceed-
ings will not be permitted to provide an avenue through which the
fundamental rights of protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures and self-incrimination can be frustrated. '94 Although
the Court has been unwilling to provide forfeiture claimants with
the whole gamut of constitutional protections enjoyed by criminal
defendants, 5 it has stressed the criminal aspects of the proceeding
when invoking fourth and fifth amendment protections.9
A related argument dismissing the need for warrants is that
forfeiture is in rem "and does not, in any degree, touch upon the
person of the offender. '97 The rights of concerned individuals gen-
erally are seen as ancillary at best; the entire structure of forfeiture
deemphasizes owners' rights.9 8 Notably, an owner's innocence is no
defense to forfeiture.9 9 This rule, upheld in some exceedingly harsh
cases,100 is justified on the ground that the action is solely in
statutes ... ." 7A J. MooRE, supra note 24, I C.11. Even those procedures offer some of the
protection provided by a magistrate's warrant. See note 89 supra.
" Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069
(1974).
" See generally Charney, supra note 85, at 483-91 (cataloguing "criminal" constitu-
tional protections and discussing their applicability to "civil" cases).
" Compare United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971)
and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965) (emphasizing
the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture in extending fourth and fifth amendment protections
thereto) with Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-90 (1974) (for-
feiture of innocent owner's property is not a deprivation of property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the fifth amendment, because forfeiture is not criminal and serves pur-
poses beyond punishment) and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States,
409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972) (civil versus criminal distinction relied on to avoid fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy prohibition).
" La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796).
98 For an extreme example of the tendency to ignore personal rights by donning in rem
blinders, see People ex rel. Hanrahan v. One 1965 Oldsmobile, 52 I. 2d 37, 45-46, 284
N.E.2d 646, 652, rev'd sub nom. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972). In that case, a
car belonging to an incarcerated robbery suspect was seized pursuant to an Illinois automo-
bile forfeiture statute. The suspect never received notice of the impending forfeiture be-
cause it was sent to his home rather than to the prison. The car was forfeited summarily
when, not surprisingly, he failed to claim it. The Illinois Supreme Court held the service
sufficient because the action was in rem; the Supreme Court reversed on due process
grounds.
" Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684-88 (1974); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-15 (1827).
100 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (yacht
belonging to lessor forfeited when lessee brought marijuana aboard, entirely unknown to
lessor); United States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury Automobile, 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.)
(new car forfeited when purchaser, who had put only $100 down, used it to commit a crime;
innocent seller forfeited the remaining value of the car), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838 (1975);
United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile, 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958) (trial court had found
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rem." o' The in rem premise, however, "is a deliberate subter-
fuge-a judicial fiction." 102 The government's treatment of prop-
erty cannot be distinguished from its treatment of the people asso-
ciated with the property. As the Supreme Court has said in a
related context, "[p]roperty does not have rights. People have
rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation,
no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
'personal' right . ... 10
It is striking that the criminal defendant is so well protected
against the illegitimate seizure of his property,0 while the owner
of property subject to civil forfeiture, who may well be uncon-
nected to any crime, is entirely unprotected. 05 If in the former sit-
uation a final judgment must authorize the seizure, it would seem
reasonable that in the latter a warrant should be required. 08 That
property is not taken as part of a criminal action against its owner
does not diminish the need for fourth amendment protection.'0 7
forfeiture "unconscionable").
101 See, e.g., United States v. Twenty-Eight "Mighty Payloader" Coin-Operated Gam-
ing Devices, 623 F.2d 510, 516 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he innocence of the owner is not a de-
fense to forfeiture, since the proceeding is in rem against the article to be forfeited.").
102 Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 252. See also note 85 supra.
,03 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (upholding federal ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) of a challenge to a state prejudgment garnish-
ment statute, against the objection that the section protected only "personal" rights).
104 See note 4 supra.
105 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (noting in the context of
administrative searches that "[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior").
106 A more obvious, but perhaps unworkable, lesson offered by the criminal forfeiture
process is that the entire forfeiture proceeding should precede seizure in civil cases as well.
This proposal answers in the most effective way the objections to a warrantless seizure. It
may seem that if preseizure notice and hearing are not required, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974), preseizure forfeiture must be dismissed a
fortiori. The Court's arguments in Pearson, however, are not altogether compelling in this
context. Further, unlike preseizure notice and hearing, requiring a final forfeiture decree
before seizure does not demand additional time or effort; it only alters the sequence of ex-
isting procedures. As noted in Pearson, however, id. at 679, there is a real possibility that
the owner will transfer, conceal, or ruin the property before seizure. In a theoretical sense
this is remedied easily by holding the owner liable for any decrease in the value of the
property (down to zero) after the beginning of the action. But such a solution is not practi-
cally reassuring: it adds complications, may prove wasteful, and may not give the govern-
ment its due if the owner is unable to pay a judgment.
107 That the property itself is the accused suggests a compelling but overlooked analogy
to the arrest of human suspects. See United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1981).
Warrantless arrests long have been sanctioned, though arrests pursuant to a warrant are
preferred. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-24 (1976). A forfeiture seizure is sim-
ply the arrest of property; the forfeiture exception may be described as the arrest rule ap-
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III. THE SAFEGUARDS OF THE WARRANT
Part II argued that the rationales for the forfeiture exception
to the warrant requirement are seriously flawed. This part contin-
ues the analysis by focusing on the important functions served by a
warrant. In particular, the warrant ensures neutral evaluation of
probable cause for seizure, prevents the circumvention of the war-
rant requirement for searches, and protects due process in addi-
tion to fourth amendment interests.
A. The Role of the Magistrate
Whenever possible, a neutral magistrate, rather than the agent
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," should assess the government's right to search and seize.10 8
In the absence of a forfeiture statute or an established exception to
the warrant requirement, property involved in the commission of a
crime can be seized only with a warrant. 10 9
When a seizure is based on the alleged involvement of
property in a crime, a magistrate's independent preliminary assess-
ment of the extent of that involvement is equally vital. Evaluating
whether property may be forfeit "often depends on the making of
delicate judgments about previous facts and circumstances," 1 0
judgments "squarely within the intended role of the magistrate
under the fourth amendment."'1 1 The frequency with which the
existence of probable cause has been questioned at trial"2 demon-
plied to things. Such an application is not necessarily appropriate, however, because of the
presence in the arrest situation of immediate postseizure procedures, bail, a greater need for
flexibility, and the severe consequences of letting the "suspect" slip away. Moreover, the
historical distinction between search and seizure of people and that of things argues against
direct application. See id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (because the search for a person is just as intrusive as the search for
property, a search warrant is required for an arrest in the home just as one is required for
seizure of property therein).
108 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
09 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3) designates as property that may be seized with a warrant
"property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of com-
mitting a criminal offense." Cf. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (warrantless
search and seizure of car carrying contraband held unconstitutional because it did not fall
within any of the recognized warrant exceptions).
110 Melendez v. Shultz, 356 F. Supp. 1205, 1210-11 (D. Mass. 1973).
111 United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444,464 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin,
C.J., dissenting). See also 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 551.
'12 In the forfeiture proceeding the initial burden is on the government to show prob-
able cause for the seizure and forfeiture. E.g., United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette,
496 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1974); 19 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) (incorporated by reference in 21
19811
The University of Chicago Law Review
strates that the status of the property often is far from clear.113
This uncertainty is particularly acute in the forfeiture situation be-
cause the evaluation is not simply factual (was there a crime and
what was the involvement of this property?) but also legal (on
these facts, is the property subject to forfeiture?). Forfeiture often
is denied because of the absence of a sufficient nexus between the
property and the crime.114 The assessment of probable cause for
seizure is a precursor to a judicial determination and therefore is
best made by a judicial officer.
That the protection of a warrant should be considered un-
necessary is particularly surprising in light of the consensus that
forfeiture is harsh and disfavored.11 5 Every precaution should be
taken to guard against unnecessary seizures.116 Because final deter-
U.S.C. § 881 (1976)). Probable cause is something more than mere suspicion and must be
reasonable under the circumstances, Bush v. United States, 389 F.2d 485, 489 (5th Cir.
1968), but falls short of a prima facie case. United States v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck,
558 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 1977); Ted's Motors v. United States, 217 F.2d 777, 780 (8th Cir.
1954). In short, the government's asserted right to the property is established by "the same
standard employed to test searches and seizures generally." United States v. One 1975 Mer-
cedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir. 1978). It should be noted that because of this con-
gruence, requiring a warrant does not increase the government's evidentiary burden.
"' For examples of seizures made without or with only questionable probable cause, see
United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Airplane, 533 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing
district court, which had found no probable cause); United States v. LaVecchia, 513 F.2d
1210 (2d Cir. 1975) (probable cause unclear); United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette,
496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1974) (government failed to show probable cause); Howard v. United
States, 423 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1970) (no evidence of probable cause); Compton v. United
States, 377 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1967) (overruling trial court's judgment non obstante
veredicto for forfeiture); United States v. One 1967 Cessna Aircraft, 454 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D.
Cal. 1978); United States v. One 1973 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 391 F. Supp. 1197
(N.D. Cal. 1975); United States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974). See
also note 119 infra.
114 See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200, 1206 (D.N.H. 1974); Suhomlin v. United
States, 345 F. Supp. 650, 654-55 (D. Md. 1972); United States v. 1,922 Assorted Firearms &
229,553 Rounds of Assorted Ammunition, 330 F. Supp. 635, 642 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
I" United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V8 Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939);
United States v. One 1977 Cadillac, 644 F.2d 500, 501 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. One
1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978); Howard v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp.,
540 F.2d 695, 697 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Seville, 477 F. Supp.
879, 882 (E.D. Mich. 1979); United States v. One 1965 Cadillac 2-Door Coupe, 260 F. Supp.
761, 762 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
118 The courts may be taken to task for a cavalier approach to unfounded seizures. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 1980) ("We see
no insult to personal liberty, or threat to property, arising from the present state of the law
."). Two decades earlier, the First Circuit had a somewhat different attitude: -
Requiring... warrants... would more closely accord with our traditional concepts of
subjecting official seizure of property to some kind of judicial scrutiny. The alternative
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mination of the property's status involves lengthy delay, 117 seizure,
particularly of an automobile,118 is likely to be a substantial and
costly imposition even if the property ultimately isreturned. Fi-
nally, there is a danger of harassment and abuse if seizures are not
judicially supervised. 19
B. Postseizure Searches
In Cooper v. California,1 20 the Supreme Court upheld the war-
to this, under the situation as presently obtains, permits government agents to sum-
marily sweep automobiles off the streets without any legal process so long as at one
time, however remote, those officials believe that the vehicle was used in furtherance of
an illicit or proscribed activity. The ipse dixit of the officer or the agent is all that is
required. However, since infallibility or omniscience is scarcely expected, the official
may well be wrong ....
Interbartolo v. United States, 303 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1962).
H7 In cases of official bad faith, the period may be exceptionally long. E.g., United
States v. One 1972 Wood 19 Foot Custom Boat, 501 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1974) (ten months);
Mayo v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Ill. 1976) (claimant filed for return of the
property after the government had held it for over two years); United States v. One 1970
Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973) (twenty months). Even when the case
apparently is pursued with reasonable diligence the property is likely to remain in the gov-
ernment's hands for several months. E.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 358 (1967) (four
months between seizure and forfeiture proceeding); United States v. One 1976 Cadillac Se-
ville, 477 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (three months); United States v. One Assortment
of 93 Firearms, 463 F. Supp. 365 (D.S.C. 1978) (two and one half months). Excessive delays
have been held unconstitutional in some cases on due process grounds. E.g., United States v.
$8,850.00 in United States Currency, 645 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1981) (eighteen months); United
States v. One Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1977) (eleven months); Sarkisian v.
United States, 472 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.) (nine months from completion of investigation to
filing of suit), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone
Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (sixteen months); United States v. One 1971 Opel
G.T., 360 F. Supp. 638 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (thirteen and one-half months).
The danger of property being seized and held for months without any judicial or official
consideration is mitigated somewhat by cases, still the exception rather than the rule, re-
quiring prompt postseizure administrative proceedings. See United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367-75 (1971); Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1978); Lee v. Thornton, 538 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring immediate hearings in
the border seizure situation, where the inconveniences are likely to be especially harsh). See
also Kandaras, supra note 21, at 932-35 (arguing for automatic and comprehensive post-
seizure hearings). Although immediate postseizure review would guard against the inequities
inherent in any seizure situation, it by no means would render warrants superfluous. The
warrant requirement would still help prevent unnecessary seizures in the first place.
"' The Supreme Court emphasized the daily importance of the automobile in Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
"It For cases in which the power to seize has been abused, see United States v. One
Buick Riviera, 374 F. Supp. 277 (D. Minn. 1973); United States v. One 1965 Cadillac 2-Door
Coupe, 260 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Boling v. Division of Narcotic Control of the
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 24 Ill. 2d 305, 181 N.E.2d 147 (1962).
120 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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rantless search of an automobile seized and held for a state for-
feiture proceeding. The car belonged to a criminal defendant, and
the evidence discovered in the search was used in obtaining his
conviction."l '
The circuits generally have read Cooper as propounding an
across-the-board rule that vehicles seized pursuant to a forfeiture
statute may be searched without a warrant,122 effectively extending
the forfeiture exception to automobile searches as well as to
seizures. Agents thus may seize a car without a warrant on the
basis of probable cause to believe it is forfeit and then search it,
although the warrantless search would not otherwise have been
legal.123 Some courts have held a prior seizure is not even neces-
121 Id. at 58. Because the seizure in Cooper was without a warrant, some courts have
interpreted the case as endorsing warrantless forfeiture seizures. United States v. Pappas,
600 F.2d 300, 303-05 (1st Cir.), vacated for rehearing en banc and decided on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 324 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Cir.
1972). This view is unfounded. As Chief Judge Coffin has noted, Cooper conceded the legal-
ity of the seizure, and the question was not before the Court. United States v. One 1975
Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 452 (1st Cir. 1980) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting). It also appears
that the seizure could have been justified as incident to arrest, for the statute directed the
arresting officer to seize the vehicle. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967). The Court's
own subsequent gloss on the decision is ambiguous: "The case stands for the proposition
that, given an unquestionably legal seizure, there are special circumstances that may vali-
date a subsequent warrantless search." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 n.21
(1971). It seems, however, that the "unquestionably legal" language was not intended to
provide a ringing endorsement to the forfeiture exception, but to emphasize that the search
is only as good as the seizure upon which it is based. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49-52 (1970).
12 See United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v.
McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563, 564
(6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Mills, 440 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837
(1971). But see United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 231-33 (9th Cir.) (suggesting that
Cooper may be limited to inventory, and not investigatory, searches), cert. denied, 437 U.S.
907 (1978).
123 In a pre-Cooper opinion, Chief Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit spoke out
strongly against this anomaly:
The effect of this decision is to hold that the officers may seize without a warrant
for probable cause that which they could not search for probable cause. And, having
seized, they may then search for and seize contraband. I have found no authority to
sanction this circumvention of the constitutional mandate which safeguards the citizen
against unreasonable searches by requiring judicial authority in the form of a search
warrant, except under circumstances which precludes [sic] its timely issuance. If this
decision is now to be the law of search and seizure, officers need no longer trouble
themselves to secure a search warrant for the seizure of a vehicle, be it standing or
moving, for, all they need to do is to decide for themselves whether there is probable
cause to believe that it is being used to violate the federal law.
Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1963) (dissenting to denial of peti-
tion for rehearing).
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sary.12 4 This anomaly suggests that to avoid outright circumven-
tion of the fourth amendment, a warrant must be required for the
initial seizure.
One could object to this argument on the ground that a seizure
warrant is an inadequate substitute for a search warrant. A search
warrant issues on probable cause to believe the search will uncover
contraband or evidence, while a warrant for seizure issues on prob-
able cause to believe the property is forfeit. Because of this incon-
gruity, a warrant for the seizure does not necessarily protect
against searches for which a warrant might not otherwise issue.
A seizure warrant provides equivalent protection, however, be-
cause it addresses the three factors Cooper relied on to legitimate
the search. First, Cooper noted that the seizure, custody, and
search of the car were all bound up with the crime that had been
committed. 12 5 Presumably the Court considered this relevant to
the question of probable cause; the connection with the crime
suggested that the search would be fruitful. Second, by emphasiz-
ing that the police were required to hold the car for an indefinite
length of time, 12  the Court suggested that the search was
grounded on a possessory interest.127 Finally, the search was a rea-
"I United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 456 (2d Cir.) ("Where federal agents
have probable cause to believe a vehicle is seizable ... they may search it without a war-
rant, regardless of whether the vehicle has first been seized . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1103 (1976); United States v. LaVecchia, 513 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350, 1360 (2d Cir. 1972) (search of an automobile while it was cargo in
the hold of a ship upheld in part on the ground that a car subject to forfeiture may be
searched without a warrant), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948 (1973). These decisions probably are
inconsistent with Cooper, which was grounded largely on the fact of police custody. See
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1968). The approach is consistent
with Cooper to the extent that Cooper is based on the possessory interest the forfeiture
statute creates rather than on the need for self-protection. See note 127 infra.
125 386 U.S. at 61.
126 Id.
117 Subsequent analyses of Cooper have found this implied possessory interest to be the
critical factor supporting the decision. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377 n.2
(1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In Cooper the Court validated [the] ... search ... on the
theory that the police had a possessory interest in the car based on a state forfeiture statute
...."); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 453 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
police [in Cooper] were authorized to treat the car in their custody as if it were their own,
and the search was sustainable as an integral part of their right of retention."); United
States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Dutile, Some Observa-
tions on the Supreme Court's Uses of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment
Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REv. 1, 17-19 (1971); Harvard Note, supra note 36, at 847 (both
concluding that the Cooper decision was based on the authorities' possessory interest). In
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), a factually similar case except for the absence
of a forfeiture statute, the warrantless search was held invalid. This suggests that the pos-
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sonable precautionary measure of police self-protection. 12 8 This
factor is premised on the legitimacy of possession by the police: if
they were not entitled to have the car, no justification for the
search based on possession would be tenable. 129
A seizure warrant goes to each of these justifications. It en-
sures that the crime, the seizure, and the custody are all of a piece;
it reflects the magistrate's evaluation that the government has a
probable possessory interest under the forfeiture statute; and it en-
sures that the seizure is proper. A seizure warrant is therefore the
functional equivalent of, and a necessary substitute for, a search
warrant when automobiles are seized pursuant to a forfeiture
statute.
C. Due Process
Two arguments in favor of requiring a warrant for forfeiture
seizures are grounded on due process rather than fourth amend-
ment concerns. The first is drawn from cases dealing with notice
and hearing requirements and the second from the threat of sum-
mary forfeiture.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,130 the Supreme Court set rigid standards
for preseizure notice and opportunity for a hearing, noting, how-
ever, that in the criminal context notice and hearing are unneces-
sary prior to a seizure pursuant to a warrant. 31 Two years later, in
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,"'2 the Court held
that forfeiture seizure "is one of those '"extraordinary situations"
that justify [sic] postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing'
until after seizure.133 This holding places great confidence in the
official assessment of the appropriateness of seizure, suggesting
sessory interest is critical; Cooper and Preston cannot be distinguished on any other ground.
But see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373-74 n.8 (1976) (ultimate forfeiture was
not a foregone conclusion in Cooper; "[n]o reason would therefore appear to limit Cooper to
an impoundment pursuant to a forfeiture statute").
128 386 U.S. at 61-62. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 423 U.S. 364, 369 (1976);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (both citing Cooper for the proposition that a
warrantless search is justified when necessary for self-protection).
29 The search is only as valid as the seizure on which it is based. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 n.21 (1971) (search in Cooper valid because subsequent to "an
unquestionably legal seizure"). In the same way, searches and seizures incident to arrest are
valid only if the arrest is valid. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
120 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
"I Id. at 93 n.30.
132 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
13I Id. at 677 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972)).
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that the assessment is made best through the warrant procedure.134
In approving prehearing seizures, the Court has emphasized
the importance of judicial safeguards. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co.,' 3 5 the Court upheld Louisiana's sequestration procedure,
which did not provide for preseizure notice and hearing, because of
its other protections: a writ for the seizure based on the creditor's
affidavit and issued by a judge, the availability of a bond proce-
dure, and the opportunity for an immediate postseizure hearing.'
The following year, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.,137 the Court struck down a Georgia garnishment statute that
put the property "totally beyond use during the pendency of the
litigation on the alleged debt, all by a writ of garnishment issued
by a court clerk. . without participation by a judicial officer." 35
The Court distinguished Mitchell on the ground that the Louisi-
ana procedure required judicial issuance of the writ on a factual
rather than on a "conclusory" basis.""
Read together, these cases underscore the importance of judi-
cially issued process for seizure when there is no prior notice or
hearing. 40 The exceptions to this rule, involving situations of pub-
lic necessity,' 4' excuse rather than undercut the warrant require-
ment. Because under Pearson notice and hearing are not required
prior to a forfeiture seizure, the inference is compelling that a war-
rant is.1 2
"' Pearson was careful to note, however, that the warrant question was not before it.
416 U.S. at 679-80 n.14.
135 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
I" Id. at 607-10. The Court required that a valid seizure scheme balance the creditor's
fear of waste or concealment of the property and the danger of violent self-help measures
against the debtor's right to protection from wrongful deprivation. The same concerns are
present in the forfeiture situation. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974).
137 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
I" Id. at 606. The quoted language would condemn, for the same reasons, a forfeiture
scheme that allowed warrantless seizures.
230 Id. at 607.
110 See Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526, 534 (5th Cir. 1978) ("It seems
clear, then, that due process requires that a prejudgment seizure be authorized by a judge
who has discretion to deny issuance of the appropriate writ."). But see Jonnet v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130 n.15 (3d Cir. 1976) (these cases "might be read to require that a
judge approve the seizure" but do "not necessarily establish judicial participation as a
constitutional requisite").
141 See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of
misbranded drugs); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of
food unfit for human consumption).
142 A more abstract analysis reaches the same conclusion. Fuentes suggested three fac-
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A second due process problem arises from the threat of sum-
mary forfeiture, which occurs if no one claims the seized property
and posts the requisite penal bond.143 The legitimacy of summary
forfeiture rests on the accuracy and reliability of the initial judg-
ment that the property is subject to forfeiture. A warrantless
seizure followed by summary forfeiture is forfeiture without any
process at all. It is difficult to believe that none is due. A minimum
level of judicial scrutiny, in the form of the issuance of a warrant
for the seizure, would provide appropriate protection.
IV. TREATMENT OF PROPERTY SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT
A. Evidentiary Use
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania" extended the
exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings. Thus, property seized
without a warrant under circumstances requiring one should be
inadmissible as evidence in the forfeiture proceeding.145 Evidence
obtained by a warrantless search subsequent to an illegal seizure
also should be inadmissible.146
Moreover, the exclusionary rule also requires that property
tors that justify dispensing with preseizure notice and hearing, 407 U.S. at 91, 93 n.30, fac-
tors echoed in Pearson, 416 U.S. at 679: seizure serves important governmental purposes,
there is a need for prompt action, and other safeguards at least partially serve the function
of notice and hearing.
Fuentes requires a balancing of the public interest and the urgency of the situation
against the individual interests implicated. In an emergency situation, seizure without any
judicial procedures would be tolerated; where the public necessity drops below a certain
threshold, however, preseizure notice and opportunity for a hearing are required. The nor-
mal search and seizure situation lies somewhere between these two extremes. In Fuentes the
Court noted that the magistrate's issuance of a warrant for the seizure of personal posses-
sions was sufficient protection in the criminal context. 407 U.S. at 93 n.30. The govern-
ment's interest in forfeiture is no greater and the circumstances no more pressing than in
the typical warrant situation. Therefore, the protective procedure should be no less than the
issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
(referring to a similar set of factors with regard to due process requirements and focusing
on, but not limiting its discussion to, the need for a hearing).
10 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609 (1976); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1976); I.R.C. § 7325. In a
decision that apparently has been ignored by the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit held the
bond requirement in 19 U.S.C. § 1608 unconstitutional as a violation of both due process
and equal protection. Wiren v. Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 763 (9th Cir. 1976). The constitutionality
of section 3724 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (present section 7325) was upheld
against a due process challenge in Colacicco v. United States, 143 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1944).
14' 380 U.S. 693, 702 (1965).
145 Id. at 702.
16 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); United States v. One 1973
Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 391 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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seized in violation of the warrant requirement be excluded in crim-
inal proceedings against an individual defendant. 147 When the de-
fendant is the owner of the property, he has standing to object to
the seizure. If the defendant has no possessory interest in the
property, however, the exclusionary rule may not apply: because
his fourth amendment rights were not violated by the warrantless
seizure, he lacks standing to invoke the rule.148
B. Forfeiture of Property Seized Without a Warrant
1. Illegal Seizure as a Bar to Forfeiture. If the seized prop-
erty cannot be introduced at the forfeiture trial, the government
may have a difficult time proving that it had probable cause for the
seizure.141 To this extent the exclusionary rule operates as a de
facto bar against forfeiture of illegally seized property.
Defects in the seizure also should limit the government's
underlying right to the property itself. A number of courts have
held that forfeiture cannot follow an invalid seizure.' 50 Two early
147 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
118 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-76 (1969). The forfeiture situation is the clearest example of the link between
property rights and standing to invoke the exclusionary rule objected to by the dissent in
Rakas. 439 U.S. at 156 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist recognized this in his opin-
ion for the Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 n. 6 (1980). See also State v.
Sweatt, 427 A.2d 940, 951-52 (Me. 1981) (Carter, J., concurring).
14' See, e.g., United States v. One 1973 Lincoln Continental Mark IV, 391 F. Supp. 1197
(N.D. Cal. 1975); People v. Mots, 27 Ill. App. 3d 982, 327 N.E.2d 419 (1975).
50 Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 1965); Doherty v. United
States, 500 F.2d 540, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1974); State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479, 485-
86 (La. 1977). Berkowitz was overruled implicitly by United States v. One 1975 Pontiac
Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 451 (1st Cir. 1980). Cf. Castleberry v. Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms
Div. of the Treasury Dep't, 530 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to consider plaintiff's
motion for return of allegedly illegally seized automobile because "the proper place to liti-
gate the legality of the seizure ... is in the forfeiture proceedings"). A number of older
circuit cases, subsequently overruled, held that forfeiture could not follow an illegal seizure.
See United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1950); United States v. Speci-
fied Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 7 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1925); United States v. Loomis,
297 F. 359 (9th Cir. 1924). A form for pleading illegal seizure as a defense in a forfeiture
action, with wording based on Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168 (1st Cir. 1965), is
found in 11 AM. Jura. PL. & PR. FORMS (Rev.) Fed. Tax Enf. Form 6 (1970).
See also Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), where IRS
agents seized untaxed liquor after breaking and entering without a search warrant. Both the
majority and dissenting Justices agreed that if the seizure were lawful, the liquor would be
forfeit. The majority, finding the search and seizure illegal, ordered the liquor returned, id.
at 77; the dissenters objected that the search and seizure were valid and the liquor therefore
was subject to forfeiture, id. at 78 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 81 (Black, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court cases' 51 and the weight of modern authority, 52
however, hold that an illegal seizure does not bar forfeiture. Their
strongest argument is that the legality of the seizure has no bear-
ing on the forfeit status of the property.153 If the property should
not have been seized, it will be returned; if it should have been
seized, the owner suffers nothing from which he would have been
protected by a warrant. In addition, a rule calling for the return of
illegally seized property might serve no function but delay because
in itself it does not prevent reseizure:'" the government need only
return the property, obtain a warrant, and reseize.255 A flat rule
forbidding reseizure consistently would deprive the government of
property to which it is entitled by statute. 56
That deprivation, however, is justified where the government's
conduct falls short of fourth amendment standards.157 If forfeiture
151 Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 197, 205 (1845) (anyone can make, in any
manner, a forfeiture seizure at his own peril; if the government adopts the seizure and the
property is forfeited, the seizer is vindicated); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342,
359 (1842) (government can adopt an illegal seizure and proceed with the forfeiture, even if
grounds therefor were unknown to the seizer).
152 United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 451 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carey, 272 F.2d 492, 494 n.6 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. One 1956
Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Eight Boxes Contain-
ing Various Articles of Miscellaneous Merchandise, 105 F.2d 896, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1939);
Mayo v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 160, 162 (E.D. IM. 1976); United States v. One 1973
Volvo, 377 F. Supp. 810, 812 (W.D. Tex. 1974); United States v. $4,171.00 in United States
Currency, 200 F. Supp. 28, 31-33 (N.D. Ill. 1961). See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 473, 475 (1966).
"5' United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 451 (1st Cir. 1980) ("there
is simply no connection here between the warrantless seizure and the government's later-
made case for possession").
15 United States v. One 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351, 352 (9th Cir.
1974); United States v. Eight Boxes Containing Various Articles of Miscellaneous Merchan-
dise, 105 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1939).
155 The property of course would remain tainted for evidentiary purposes. Unless a war-
rant for a subsequent search and seizure is based on independent, "untainted" evidence, the
government cannot simply return the property and redo the procedure properly. E.g.,
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
15 An illegal seizure defense would be used only in those cases in which there was prob-
able cause for seizure and forfeiture, because the absence of probable cause could itself be
pleaded as a defense to the forfeiture.
157 See Dutile, supra note 127, at 20-25. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e):
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court
for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the
ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the property which was illegally
seized.... If the motion is granted the property shall be restored and it shall not be
admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.
This rule reflects a legislative judgment that the legality of the seizure bears on the govern-
ment's possessory right. Although the rule does not apply to forfeitures, where the individ-
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may proceed despite a warrantless seizure, there is little incentive
to obtain a warrant in the first place. Analogy to the exclusionary
rule, grounded on a similar rationale of deterring illegal govern-
ment conduct, supports an absolute bar to forfeiture.1"8 Such an
extension of the exclusionary rule could be objected to on the
ground that, unlike the use of illegally seized evidence, the forfeit-
ure of illegally seized property is not an exacerbation of a constitu-
tional injury. Whereas use of illegally seized evidence relies on ille-
gal conduct in a continuing manner to the detriment of the
defendant, the harm in the forfeiture context arguably comes en-
tirely from the seizure itself and is not made worse by proceeding
with the forfeiture. 8 9
Proceeding with forfeiture despite an illegal seizure could be
supported by analogy to the law of arrests. An illegal arrest does
not bar prosecution, even though such a rule would serve the same
deterrent purposes as the exclusionary rule.160 The cost of error is
too high, and the illegality of the arrest has no bearing on the gov-
ernment's case for conviction, which may be made by untainted
evidence.161 Applying this reasoning to forfeitures, it can be argued
ual's rights of "lawful possession" are in question, the concept is analogous.
158 See United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1950) (rule that
forfeiture cannot follow an illegal seizure "fits in well" with exclusionary rule), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1963).
" See Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926) ("The exclusion of evidence
obtained by an unlawful search and seizure stand [sic] on a different ground [from the for-
feiture of property seized by unauthorized local agents]. If the search and seizure are unlaw-
ful as invading personal rights secured by the Constitution those rights would be infringed
yet further if the evidence were allowed to be used."). But see Berkowitz v. United States,
340 F.2d 168, 173 (1st Cir. 1965) (arguing that forfeiture is such a further infringement);
text and notes at notes 169-171 infra.
160 A recent restatement of that rule makes perfect sense if the "accused" is the
property in a forfeiture proceeding.
The exclusionary principle of Wong Sun and Silverthorne Lumber Co. delimits what
proof the Government may offer against the accused at trial, closing the courtroom
door to evidence secured by official lawlessness. Respondent is not himself a suppress-
ible "fruit," and the illegality of his detention cannot deprive the Government of the
opportunity to prove his guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted
by the police misconduct.
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
16' See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966):
Our numerous precedents ordering the exclusion of such illegally obtained evidence
assume implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution alto-
gether. So drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclu-
sionary rules, but it would also increase to an intolerable degree interference with the
public interest in having the guilty brought to book.
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that sufficient deterrence is provided by the exclusionary rule, and
that any added deterrence achieved by barring forfeiture is out-
weighed by the cost to society.
There are two flaws in this reasoning. First, the cost of barring
forfeiture is slight. Rather than letting a criminal loose, the govern-
ment is only deprived of a piece of property.16 2 Second, because
the government's burden of proof is minimal in the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, the deterrent value of excluding certain evidence is far
less than in the criminal context; in many cases the evidence will
be unnecessary. To enhance deterrence, forfeiture of illegally
seized property should be blocked altogether and reseizure
prohibited.
2. Jurisdictional Issues. An illegal seizure also may prevent
subsequent forfeiture by depriving the court of jurisdiction. Be-
cause forfeiture is in rem, jurisdiction is obtained by seizing the
property and bringing it before the court.163 It can be argued that
if the property is unlawfully seized, it is improperly before the
court and that the court therefore lacks jurisdiction.,," Conversely,
it could be argued that as long as the property is before the court
it does not matter how it got there.6 5 A series of early Supreme
Court cases supports the view that jurisdiction does not hinge on
the legality of seizure. For example, in Dodge v. United States,166
seizure was made by city police officers, although the statute only
authorized seizure by federal officers. Justice Holmes noted that
however effected, the seizure successfully brought the property
within the jurisdiction of the court, for "[t]he owner of the prop-
162 A frequently stated purpose of civil forfeiture is to take property out of the hands of
those who will use it to commit crimes. The rationale is dual: first, continued possession will
permit continued criminal activity; second, forcing the criminal to reinvest in equipment
decreases the profitability of the criminal enterprise. H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950), reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2952; S. REP. No. 926, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). However, although the property on occasion may be used again
criminally, this reflects the failure of the criminal, rather than the forfeiture, process.
163 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974); The Brig
Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 291 (1815). Jurisdiction is granted to the court of the district
in which the seizure occurred. E.g., I.R.C. § 7323(a).
1" A line of Third Circuit cases so argued. United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d
180, 182 (3d Cir. 1950); Daufer-Lieberman Brewing Co. v. United States, 8 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir.
1925). However, the Circuit abandoned this view in United States v. $1,058.00 in United
States Currency, 323 F.2d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 1963).
18I United States v. $4,171.00 in United States Currency, 200 F. Supp. 28, 31-32 (N.D.
IMI. 1961). Moore is unclear on this point. 7A J. MOORE, supra note 24, T C.11 n.5 ("If there
is in fact a seizure, it may not matter that it was improperly or unlawfully made.").
1- 272 U.S. 530 (1926).
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erty suffers nothing that he would not have suffered if the seizure
had been authorized. 16 7
Courts citing Dodge for the absolute proposition that an illegal
seizure does not bar forfeiture6 8 read too much into the case. In
Dodge the Court spoke in terms of the federal government's adop-
tion of the city's seizure. It is one thing to adopt a seizure made by
a state official without technical statutory authority, and quite an-
other for the government to adopt an unconstitutional seizure by
its own agents. One should question, on both technical and policy
grounds, why the government should obtain the court's jurisdiction
to forfeit someone's property by seizing it illegally.169 Moreover,
basing jurisdiction on an illegal seizure is a continuing use of an
illegal seizure to the detriment of the claimant in much the same
way that use of illegally obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding
is a continuing constitutional violation. Viewed in this light, Jus-
tice Holmes's assertion in Dodge that the forfeiture does not con-
stitute a further infringement of constitutional rights1 70 is uncon-
vincing. Because the seizure is the basis of the court's jurisdiction,
the forfeiture proceeding amounts to a use of the illegal seizure to
take the claimant's property permanently.17 1
167 Id. at 532. This justification is curious in that the same often could be said, for
example, of the admission of improperly seized evidence.
1I John Bacall Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1969); United
States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1958) (specifically re-
jecting the argument that the Supreme Court cases were limited to instances of the govern-
ment's adoption of seizures by nonfederal agents); United States v. Eight Boxes Containing
Various Articles of Miscellaneous Merchandise, 105 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir. 1939). But see
Berkowitz v. United States, 340 F.2d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 1965) (distinguishing Dodge on the
ground that it involved a seizure made without statutory authority, as opposed to one in
violation of the fourth amendment).
1I The same considerations are present in cases holding that a court lacks jurisdiction
when the defendant has been induced to enter its territorial jurisdiction by deceit or trick-
ery. See Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 256 (1909); Fitzgerald &
Mallory Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U.S. 98, 105 (1890) (also implying that the court
would lack in rem jurisdiction if the "property had been brought into the state by means of
fraudulent inducement"); Mallin v. Sunshine Kitchens, Inc., 314 So. 2d 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1976). See generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 551
(1964). It sometimes is held that jurisdiction is never acquired in such circumstances, Wy-
man v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 315 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938); alterna-
tively, it is argued that the court acquires but should refuse to exercise jurisdiction,
Buchanan v. Wilson, 254 F.2d 849, 850 (6th Cir. 1958).
170 272 U.S. at 532.
M Even if this argument is accepted, it does not address whether the government may
simply return the property, obtain a warrant, and reseize. Such a procedure presumably
would provide jurisdiction. The fact that the initial jurisdiction was defective does not bar
the government from trying again; a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction has no res judicata
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3. Derivative Versus Per Se Contraband. Per se contra-
band1 7 1 is never returned to its owner, even at the conclusion of all
related criminal proceedings 17  and even if illegally seized.17 4 On
the other hand, derivative contraband must be returned absent a
statutory authorization for forfeiture. A rule denying return of all
derivative contraband, presumably on the basis of an automatic
forfeiture theory, would be "unsupported, broad and potentially
unmanageable. 1 7 5
Illegally seized per se contraband is not returned for three
reasons. First, return of such articles is against public policy.176
Second, the complete absence of any rights in the contraband
means that the former possessor suffers no injury from the govern-
ment's retention of the property. Insofar as his privacy rights may
have been infringed by the search and seizure, he is protected by
the exclusionary rule. Third, because per se contraband is de-
stroyed, deterrence against illegal seizures is not reduced by al-
lowing the government to retain such contraband.
In the case of derivative contraband, the very absence of these
factors suggests that an illegal seizure should bar forfeiture. First,
the public policy difficulties posed by return of a car are far less
severe than those raised by the return of heroin or counterfeit
money. Second, the owner still may have property rights. Finally,
because the government can benefit from possession of the deriva-
tive contraband,7 requiring the return of illegally seized deriva-
tive contraband serves an important deterrent function.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps without realizing it, most courts in effect have
adopted the same rules for forfeiture seizures as the Supreme
Court has outlined for arrests: a warrant is unnecessary; an uncon-
stitutional seizure does not bar "prosecution"; and a search may be
effect. A rule forbidding reseizure therefore must be based on the policy reasons outlined
above. See text and notes at notes 157-162 supra.
172 For the distinction between derivative and per se contraband, see note 17 supra.
173 See United States v. LaFalch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
971 (1978).
174 See United States v. Trupiano, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (still that had been seized
unconstitutionally inadmissible as evidence but not returned because per se contraband).
176 United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
171 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1951).
177 The government either will retain the property for its own use or sell it and keep the
proceeds. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1976).
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made incident to the seizure. The debt to the arrest scheme goes
unacknowledged, but the parallels are undeniable.
Conceptually, this congruence is pleasing and perhaps appro-
priate. It gives rise to a clearly demarcated body of seizure law17 8
in which the warrant requirement is far less strict than it is for
searches. Such an approach may be the inevitable result of, or is at
least legitimized by, the emphasis in recent years on privacy inter-
ests; this emphasis naturally leads to a concern with the intrusive-
ness of the search as distinct from that of the seizure.
This comment has demonstrated that such a dichotomy is
misguided. In the forfeiture situation, a seizure warrant protectsimportant property and privacy interests and guards against the
evisceration of the search warrant requirement. In the absence of
exigent circumstances, a seizure for forfeiture should be made only
pursuant to a warrant, and a warrantless seizure should dictate the
permanent return of the property.
Michael E. Herz
178 United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 369-70 (3d Cir. 1981), finds an emerging trend
toward such a demarcation.
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